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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, President Trump’s triggering of appropriation lapses brought
on a dramatic confrontation between the elected branches. His insistence on
five billion dollars in congressional appropriations to build a wall along the
*
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border with Mexico—later transferred by his fiat from other spending—led
to the agencies normally funded by seven appropriation bills instead having
appropriation lapses and shutting down.1 Under the law that has evolved for
shutdowns, only “essential” agencies and programs could continue to call
their employees into work; whereas, non-essential agencies must furlough
their employees.2 No public employees received pay, whether essential or
not.3
Despite this, shutdowns are too often overlooked as not important to
the separation of powers, presumably because they are seen as nonadjudicated or merely statutory issues, rather than constitutional ones. Until
2019, there were few law review articles on the topic of government
shutdowns, and they only looked at big and lengthy shutdowns.4 Therefore,
shutdowns could be seen as just a kind of political mishap. However,
appropriation lapses and ensuing shutdowns are a noteworthy part of the
Fiscal Constitution.5 And the 2019 shutdown brought front and center a major
legal controversy—an administration that stretched the law governing
shutdowns to its brink.
The Anti-Deficiency Act (“ADA”), the statute governing shutdowns,
requires a narrow definition of an agency that is so essential it continues to
operate during a shutdown.6 By contrast, the Trump Administration, which
initially had voluntarily taken the blame for the shutdown, implemented a
broad definition of agencies and programs that continued to operate.7
Regardless, the burden on government employees remained high because,
essential or not, they did not receive pay during the shutdown.8
However, by keeping agencies in operation with unpaid employees,
the Trump Administration aimed to reduce the public burden so that the public

1
Q&A: Everything You Should Know About Government Shutdowns, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE
FED. BUDGET, http://www.crfb.org/sites/default/files/QAShutdownsJan2019.pdf (Jan. 7, 2019); Kellie
Mejdrich & Jennifer Shutt, In Appropriations Endgame, All Roads Lead to Border Wall, ROLL CALL (Nov.
13, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/11/13/in-appropriations-endgame-all-roads-lead-toborder-wall/.
2
See OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., GUIDANCE FOR SHUTDOWN FURLOUGHS 1–6 (Sept. 2015),
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/furlough -guideance-for-shutdown-furloughs.pdf.
3
Id. at 6. The employees are to be paid “at the earliest date possible after the lapse in appropriations
end.” 31 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2).
4
For an example of such a law review article discussing shutdowns, see Charles Tiefer, Confronting
Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces Federal Shutdowns and (Almost) Debt Defaults, 43 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 511, 513 (2014).
5
The Fiscal Constitution is “the sum of the constitutional provisions bearing on taxation and
expenditure, including both rules defining the fiscal competence of the branches of the federal government
and rules allocating taxing and spending powers between the federal government and the states.” Kenneth
W. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 (1977).
6
See 31 U.S.C. §1341–42.
7
Maegan Vasquez, Trump’s Ever-Shifting Shutdown Blame Game, CNN (Jan. 3, 2019, 2:42 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/politics/government-shutdown-blame-game-donald-trump/index.html.
8
See OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 2, at 6.
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would not condemn the Administration.9 This approach involved more than
just strained and dubious, but limited, applications of shutdown law—it
involved a very different approach to the entirety of shutdown law.
II: ROADMAP: HOW THIS ARTICLE TREATS SHUTDOWNS10
Part III of this Article compares shutdowns with other aspects of the
separation of powers. Articles I and II of the Constitution establish numerous
contexts in which the Executive and Legislative branches compete for power
on issues such as impeachments and executive privileges.11
Shutdowns belong with other aspects of separation of powers. Such
struggles are a high stakes public clash between the President and Congress.
Therefore, shutdowns have a place in the combination of constitutional
provisions and key statutes establishing what is called the “Fiscal
Constitution.” Shutdown law, and its related struggles, derive from the
Appropriations Clause and ADA.12 In fact, it is normal for separation of
powers struggles to involve statutes, intermittent occurrences, and disputed
aspects. Shutdowns also involve all of these, and therefore, have a definite
place in the taxonomy of checks and balances.
Part IV of this Article provides the history and the mechanics of
shutdown law. In quick summary, the Constitution’s “No Spending Without
Appropriations” Clause (“Appropriations Clause”) derives from English and
colonial backgrounds.13 Then, Congress implemented the Appropriations
Clause by enacting the ADA.14 The idea of the modern government shutdown
dates from opinions by Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti (“Civiletti”).15
Since then, shutdown law has been refined in the course of a couple
of major impasses. First, in 1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich clashed with
President Bill Clinton.16 Second, in 2013, the Republican House fought with
President Barack Obama.17 That meant there had been over seventeen years
9
See Katie Rogers & Alan Rappeport, White House Redefines Who Is Essential to Get Parts of
Government Moving Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2RQz0WI.
10
The single most useful resource on government shutdowns are documents compiled by the
Congressional Research Service. See, e.g., CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34680,
SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS (2018), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf.
11
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I–II.
12
See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; 31 U.S.C § 1341; see also BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 4–5.
13
Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1353–54 (1988).
14
Id. at 1374.
15
See generally Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriations,
43 Op. Att’y Gen. 224 (1980); Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a
Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293 (1981). The 1981 opinion was described
thusly: “The 1981 [Attorney General Opinion] answered [the] questions [concerning temporary lapses in
appropriations] and became the operational guide for agencies faced with a lapse in appropriations. In
form and reasoning the 1981 [Attorney General Opinion] resembles a judicial opinion . . . .” Alan L. Feld,
Shutting Down the Government, 69 B.U. L. REV. 971, 973 (1989).
16
Q&A: Everything You Should Know About Government Shutdowns, supra note 1.
17
Id.
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between major funding gaps.18 Up to this point, it might have been possible
to dismiss shutdowns as rare and minor confusions. However, all this
prepared the way for the dramatic 2019 shutdown (“the 2019 shutdown”).
Part V of this Article focuses on the 2019 shutdown. This Article
discusses how the Trump Administration’s efforts were illegal. It also
explores the key distinction between essential and non-essential federal
workers. This distinction shapes the shutdown even though, after a shutdown,
Congress retroactively pays both groups of employees.19 The 2019 shutdown
was characterized by the Trump Administration’s dramatic efforts to make
the shutdown more palatable to the public by keeping many federal workers
on the job, despite not being able to pay them. Therefore, Part V looks at
particular efforts taken by the Trump Administration that were not for the
sake of legality but for the purpose of propitiating President Trump’s
supporters.
Finally, Part VI looks at proposed solutions. The complete solution—
an automatic continuing resolution—has never won much acceptance and will
never overcome congressional antipathy to the supplanting of its
appropriation process.20 Other measures could ameliorate the sharpest
immediate pain of a shutdown, namely, bettering the condition of the unpaid
federal employees who are helpless pawns during shutdowns.
III. WHY SHUTDOWNS COUNT
It could be asked whether shutdowns really matter in the world of
separation of powers. Yes, they are indubitably high stakes clashes between
the President and Congress, loud, and involve a lot of money. However, so
are fights over overriding presidential vetoes or defense spending. But these
either have no diverse legal issues or are just political issues and are thus
legally insubstantial. Maybe shutdowns are not substantial enough to warrant
legal attention. So why study shutdowns?
In answering this question, the place to start is that shutdowns are a
high stakes public clash between the President and Congress. They catch the
whole nation’s attention.21 They strike agencies and programs with eventual
operations in the hundreds of billions of dollars.22 Additionally, they involve
a range of legal issues. Notably, some agencies and programs continue to
operate, with asserted legality, as “essential” programs, while some just

18

BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 3.
See OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 2, at 6.
20
A continuing resolution is legislation that allows agencies to continue operating until regular
appropriations can be enacted. Continuing Resolution/Continuing Appropriations, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/continuing_resolution.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
21
BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 26–29.
22
Id. at 26–35.
19
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shutdown.23 And President Trump assumed great power over which ones
continue to operate.
The fact that shutdowns do not involve purely constitutional
considerations does not have significance upon close examination.
Shutdowns do bring into play more than the bare and raw constitutional
provision of the Appropriations Clause. Indeed, shutdowns derive both from
the Appropriations Clause and the statutory language and import of the
ADA.24
The whole of the Fiscal Constitution derives from this kind of mix of
the Appropriations Clause and implementing statutes.25 In the past, there have
been struggles over impoundments—presidential claims of power not to
spend appropriations—but this too draws on the Fiscal Constitution, statutory
implementation-like appropriation acts, and, once enacted, the Impoundment
Control Act.26 There have also been struggles over appropriation riders and
war powers.27
Shutdowns do not become legally insubstantial simply because they
do not show up much in judicial decisions or because they occur at
unpredictable intervals.28 Whatever the view of law students, professors, and
lawyers, they all recognize that judicial decisions only show a part of legal
issues. Particularly in the area of separation of powers between Congress and
the President, a great deal of the law shows up in non-judicial sources.29
For example, war powers show up far more in presidential actions,
and congressional reactions, than in judicial decisions. Many questions have
been raised about, for example, whether the war with the Islamic State in Iraq

23
Deborah Barfield Barry & Michael Collins, Shutdown Puts Some Programs on Hold, but Most
Government Agencies Continue Running, USA TODAY (Dec. 27, 2018, 3:16 PM), https://www.usatoday.
com/story/news/politics/2018/12/27/shutdown-does-not-shutter-all-government-agencies-donald-trumpcongress/2422203002/.
24
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; 31 U.S.C § 1341–42; see also BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 4–
5.
25
See Charles Tiefer, “Budgetized” Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress’s
1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 415–16 (1996).
26
SEAN M. STIFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46417, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER APPROPRIATIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 46 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf
/R/R46417; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974. Pub. L. No.
93-344 (1974).
27
Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 291,
292–93 (2006).
28
A recent, and notable, case involving shutdown related litigation was Martin v. United States. See
generally 117 Fed. Cl. 611 (2014). In this case, the plaintiffs were government workers who were required
to work during a shutdown, but they were not paid their regular or overtime wages on their regularly
scheduled pay day. Id. at 613. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that, in this particular instance, the shutdown and lack
of regular pay violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. Martin v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 578, 584 (2017).
29
See, e.g., BRASS ET AL., supra note 10; STIFF, supra note 26; MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44334, SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN OVERVIEW (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R44334.pdf.
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and Syria properly derived from congressional authorizations.30 Few expect
this to be resolved by the courts.31
As for unpredictable intervals, presidential impeachments certainly
have not shown up on judicial schedules more frequently, or less predictably,
than government shutdowns.32 While the courts get tapped on peripheral
questions, namely questions about obtaining witnesses and documents, they
do not get to the heart of what is an impeachable offense.33
For the 2019 shutdown, the meaningful standard depends on whether
there was a major controversy between Congress and the President, of a
recurring type, involving real legal issues.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF SHUTDOWN LAW
A. The Constitution and the ADA
1. The Appropriations Clause Generally
The Appropriations Clause states: “No Money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”34
Although the text, by itself, does not dictate in detail about shutdowns, it has
some important foundations for the eventual evolution of government
shutdown. First, it is stronger and phrased in a definitive way when compared
to other Article I clauses. It does not just speak like the Commerce Clause
and suggest Congress may—or may not—enact laws to regulate commerce.35
Rather, it operates potently and universally. Congress does not have to enact
laws of any particular kind to activate the Appropriations Clause. Instead, it
operates to bar spending unless and until Congress promulgates such
appropriations.36 And the Clause operates directly on the Treasury
Department, and not just in some general way on vague potential subjects of
legislation.37 The Clause is the cornerstone of the Fiscal Constitution.38
Second, the key word “appropriations” comes with an established
meaning. Appropriations do not just vaguely say “go spend.” They have an
30
Charles Tiefer & Kathleen Clark, Congressional and Presidential War Powers as a Dialogue:
Analysis of the Syrian and Isis Conflicts, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 683, 684–86 (2016).
31
Id. at 699.
32
See generally Charles Tiefer, The Senate Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407
(1999); Charles Tiefer, The Controversial Transition Between Investigating the President and Impeaching
Him, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 111 (1999); Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President,
5 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL ROUNDTABLE 143 (1998).
33
See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); JARED P. COLE & TODD GARVEY, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R46013, IMPEACHMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R46013.
34
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
35
Compare id. with id art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; Stith, supra note 13, at 1345.
37
Stith, supra note 13, at 1345.
38
See generally id.; Dam, supra note 5.
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object, a purpose, and importantly for this Article, a duration. As explained
by Alexander Hamilton: “no money can be expended, but for an object, to an
extent, and out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.”39 In short, when
appropriations expire, the money stops, and Congress may well arrange that
the pay for employees stops. When the Appropriations Clause speaks of
“Appropriations made by Law,” it means appropriations that do not remain
available after their duration expires.40 With exceptions, appropriations last
one year.41 Hence, the spending must stop when that year ends, barring the
addition of any congressional extensions, like a month-long continuing
resolution. After that, the Appropriations Clause is at least open to the
possibility that, in some way, executive operations that draw upon expiring
appropriations, shall shutdown when the duration runs out.
2. English Background Behind the Appropriations Clause
As previously stated, the formulation of the Appropriations Clause
draws on English and colonial precedents. In both places, the English Crown
or its colonial governors wanted money for unpopular causes, like unpopular
wars.42 Parliament and the colonial legislatures reacted by imposing a
requirement that the legislature had to agree by “appropriations” for such
spending to occur.43 As one law review article sums up this evolution:
Accordingly, from the tumultuous seventeenth-century Civil
Wars to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the
development of the fiscal-military state in the eighteenth
century, the English Crown's dependence on parliamentary
appropriations provided a central mechanism for degrading
royal authority and enforcing legal constraints on executive
power. In the colonies, likewise, local legislative control
over taxes and appropriations provided an important means
of restraining otherwise unaccountable royal governors.
Indeed, royal efforts to cut governors loose from local purse
strings provided one important impetus for the Revolution. 44
This is still quite relevant to today. In 2019, President Trump had a
goal as to appropriations that was not so different from the goal of the Crown
in England and colonial governors. He had a project—a wall at the Mexican
border—affecting our relations with a foreign country, which he had proposed

39
Explanation (Nov. 11, 1795), reprinted in 8 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 122, 128
(Henry Cabot Lodge, ed. 1904).
40
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separations of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 366
(2018).
41
Id. at 367.
42
Id. at 366–67.
43
See id.
44
Id. at 367.
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and vigorously campaigned for, but which remained unpopular.45 Congress
refused money for the wall.46 So he vetoed the appropriation bill for a
significant part of the government.47 President Trump was like the English
Crown and colonial governors because he wanted a project and the legislature
refused appropriations for it. Unfortunately for President Trump, the
Appropriations Clause says the legislature holds the trump card in this
situation, and President Trump was fighting to overcome this.
3. Congress Enacts the ADA
Congress implemented the Appropriations Clause by enacting the
ADA.48 The ADA was not implemented from the outset in terms of shutting
down agencies during appropriation lapses.49 As one law review article
explains why Congress enacted it:
The Antideficiency Act is the main source of law that
delineates Congress’s constitutional power over the spending
of money. Section 1341 of the Act states that “[a]n officer or
employee of the United States Government. . .may not make
or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an
amount available in an appropriation” by Congress. The
Antideficiency Act also states that Contracting Officers
cannot create contractual obligations that exceed the amount
of funds that Congress has approved. In the 1800s, the
executive branch commonly created contracts without
obtaining prior congressional approval for the use of funds
from the Treasury. Because the government was obligated
to pay for the services it received under those contracts,
Congress was later forced to appropriate money to cover the
costs of those contracts over which it had had no input or say
in creating. The executive branch had therefore found an
effective way to get around Congress’s constitutional power
over appropriations, and agencies were able to force
Congress to spend money on projects for which it had not
45
Janell Fetterolf, Border Wall is Trump’s Least Popular Policy Internationally, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 28, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/28/border-wall-is-trumps-least-popularpolicy-internationally/; Gary Langer, 64% Oppose Trump’s Move to Build a Wall; On Asylum, Just 30%
Support Stricter Rules, ABC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/64-opposetrumps-move-build-wall-asylum-30/story?id=62702683.
46
Susan Cornwell & Richard Cowan, House Passes Bill Rejecting Trump's Border Wall Emergency,
REUTERS (February 26, 2019, 1:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-congress/housepasses-bill-rejecting-trumps-border-wall-emergency-idUSKCN1QF0FX.
47
Jacob Pramuk, In His First Veto, Trump Rejects Bill That Would Block His Border Emergency,
CNBC (Mar. 15, 2019, 6:21PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/trump-vetoes-bill-that-would-blockborder-wall-national-emergency.html.
48
31 U.S.C. § 1341.
49
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PAD-81-31, FUNDING GAPS JEOPARDIZE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS 37 (1981), https://www.gao.gov/assets/140/132616.pdf.
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expressly granted legislative approval.50
Therefore, ADA laid the foundation for shutdowns to occur, and today the
ADA is the “charter” of shutdowns.
B. The Civiletti Opinions
The ADA was not read until the 1970s as applying to lapses between
one appropriation and the next. In the early stages of the ADA, and as the
General Accounting Office (“GAO”) explained: “most [f]ederal managers
continued to operate during periods of funding gaps while minimizing all
nonessential operations and obligations, believing that Congress did not
intend that agencies close down while the appropriations measures were being
passed.”51 Therefore, lapses did not cause a full-scale shutdown, but what
might be called a slowdown.52 Because agencies minimized non-essential
operations, Congress and the President were motivated to resolve
appropriations disputes to get agencies fully active.53 Still, the scale of these
slowdowns is not clear because the GAO did not cite anything regarding the
Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) government planning, nor did
it cite any comprehensive Attorney General opinions that pre-date the
Civiletti opinions.54
Shutdowns, in their modern understanding, started with opinions by
Attorney General Civiletti in 1980 and 1981 (“Civiletti opinions”). In 1980,
Congress had deliberately not voted for an appropriation for the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) because of how controversial some of the FTC’s
initiatives were, and hence, how controversial some of the appropriation
riders were that took away the authority of the FTC.55 The 1980 Civiletti
opinion (“first Civiletti opinion”) was so strict about shutting the FTC down
that a backlash ensued when there was a lapse in government-wide
appropriations, leading to a moderated opinion in 1981 (“second Civiletti
opinion”).56
The Civiletti opinions may have occurred for a specific reason.
Increasing polarization in Congress led to more offerings of controversial
50
Darnell Curren, Government Contracting in the Shadow of the October 2013 Federal Government
Shutdown, 44 PUB. CONT. L.J. 349, 352 (2015).
51
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF, supra note 49, at i. The GAO was originally called the General Accounting
Office but was subsequently renamed the General Accountability Office in 2004. See GAO Human Capital
Reform Act of 2004 Pub. L. 108–271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004). Throughout this Article, GAO refers to the
organization under both names.
52
See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF, supra note 49, at 2.
53
SEE ID.
54
See generally id.
55
See Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 294–95 (1981).
56
See generally Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriations,
43 Op. Att’y Gen. 224 (1980); Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a
Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293 (1981).
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policy provisions on appropriations, called “riders.”57 As a result,
appropriation bills might not become enacted not simply because of disputes
over how much to spend, but now also over partisan disputes over policy
riders. FTC policies elicited a dispute over its funding, leading to the first
Civiletti opinion.58
Besides generally prescribing shutdowns for appropriation lapses, the
main point of the second Civiletti opinion was to describe the exception of
allowing some agencies to continue to function.59 First, Civiletti naturally
reasoned that since the ADA allowed spending “authorized by law,” it
covered initiatives based on the President’s own constitutional or other
authority.60 But Civiletti ducked on this, stating that “[u]nfortunately, no
catalogue is possible of those exercises of presidential power that may
properly obligate funds in advance of appropriations.”61
Second, and more importantly, the ADA provided that during
appropriations lapses, personnel could not be employed “except in cases of
emergency involving the safety of human life or the protection of property.”62
This is the key phrase governing shutdowns. Civiletti noted that this language
represented some relaxation compared to the language in amendment
proposals from the 1950s.63 To reach this conclusion, namely that examples
of arguable appropriation lapse examples would be widespread, Civiletti
bestowed interpretive power on the OMB, stating: “[t]his interpretation is
buttressed by the history of interpretation by the Bureau of the Budget and its
successor, the Office of Management and Budget . . . .”64 Civiletti also cited,
with approval, some helpful examples of what the OMB had approved as
within these exceptions:
Activities for which deficiency apportionments have been
granted on this basis include Federal Bureau of Investigation
criminal investigations, legal services rendered by the
Department of Agriculture in connection with state meat
inspection programs and enforcement of the Wholesome
Meat Act of 1967, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695, the protection and
management of commodity inventories by the Commodity
Credit Corporation, and the investigation of aircraft accidents

57

U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF, supra note 49, at 10–11.
Ian Shapira, Meet the Democrat Who Paved the Way for Government Shutdowns. Yes, a Democrat,
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/17/meetdemocrat-who-paved-way-government-shutdowns-yes-democrat/.
59
See generally Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse
in Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293 (1981).
60
See id. at 300–01.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 301 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 665(b) (1950)).
63
See id. at 301–02.
64
Id. at 303.
58
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by the National Transportation Safety Board.65
These examples became a kind of established precedent and guided
interpretation of shutdown law.
C. Modern Shutdowns
The Civiletti opinions launched the modern era of shutdowns. After
the Civiletti opinions, there were several very short, temporary appropriations
lapses.66 As Attorney General Walter Dellinger (“Dellinger”) said in a 1995
opinion: “[s]ince the issuance of the extensive 1981 Opinion, the prospect of
a general appropriations lapse has arisen frequently. In 1981, 1982, 1983,
1984, 1986, 1987, and 1990, lapses of funding ranging from several hours to
three days actually did occur.”67 In addition to these temporary lapses, there
were also some threatened lapses where the Executive or Congress came to
the brink of, but did not actually trigger, a funding lapse.68
Additionally, the OMB and its agencies regularly updated their plans
for what to do in a shutdown.69 These temporary and threatened lapses and
the OMB’s planning activities did not radically alter the understanding of
what happens in a shutdown. On the contrary, it reinforced the sense that the
nature of a shutdown stayed stable and could be trusted by all sides to provide
a roadmap to apply to whatever happened in the world of appropriation lapses.
1. Congressional Response to the Civiletti Opinions
In 1990, Congress responded to the second Civiletti opinion by
amending the ADA. It did so by enacting 31 U.S.C. § 1342. Notably, Section
1342 defined emergency operations as those “involving the safety of human
life or the protection of property” and did not include “ongoing, regular
functions of government, the suspension of which would not imminently
threaten the safety of human life or the protection of property.”70
The legislative history drove home the following: “[t]he conference
report also makes conforming changes . . . to make clear that . . . ongoing,
regular operations of the Government cannot be sustained in the absence of
appropriations . . . .”71 The legislative history also added that:
These changes guard against what the conferees believe
might be an overly broad interpretation of an opinion of the
65

Id. at 304.
Government Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations, 1995 O.L.C. LEXIS 57, at *3
(Aug. 16, 1995).
67
Id. at *3–4 (emphasis omitted).
68
See id. at *4.
69
See Applicability of the Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency’s Appropriations, 43 Op.
Att’y Gen. 224, 227 (1980).
70
31 U.S.C. § 1342.
71
H.R. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1170 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2875.
66
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Attorney General issued on January 16, 1981, regarding the
authority for the continuance of Government functions
during the temporary lapse of appropriations, and affirm that
the constitutional power of the purse resides with Congress.72
In enacting Section 1342, the key new point was the contrast of
emergency functions that would justify essential employees working with
“ongoing, regular functions of government.”73 Congress reinforced the
strength of this point by indicating that threats to safety or property had to be
imminent.74 This further contrasts what the Trump Administration did in
2019.75
Section 1342, its legislative history, and the reading of these by
Dellinger in his 1995 opinion all narrowed what the Executive Branch could
do to keep numerous agencies open during a shutdown just to help out, rather
than for imminent emergencies.76 And the legislative history, in Dellinger’s
reading, identified bluntly the Fiscal Constitution’s involvement—that the
action would “affirm that the constitutional power of the purse resides with
Congress.”77
2. Early Shutdowns Under the Modern View of Shutdowns: 1995 and
2013
The first of the three major shutdowns after the Civiletti opinions
occurred in 1995 (“the 1995 shutdown”). This shutdown derived from the
election of a new Republican House and Senate, with an ambitious legislative
agenda.78 The Republican House, with Newt Gingrich as Speaker, clashed
with the Democratic President, Bill Clinton.79 Discussed below is the concept
that the public “blames” on side, either Congress or the President, for a
shutdown.80 In this instance, the public blamed the Republican House.81
President Clinton implemented the shutdown by stopping a number of agency
functions, typified by the closure of public parks.82 In the end, the public
dislike of the shutdown, and its blaming Gingrich and Republicans, forced

72

Id.
31 U.S.C. § 1342.
Id.
75
See infra Part V.
76
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1342; H.R. REP. NO. 101-964; Government Operations in the Event of a Lapse
in Appropriations, 1995 O.L.C. LEXIS 57, at *3 (Aug. 16, 1995).
77
H.R. REP. NO. 101-964, at 1170.
78
See Margaret Sanregret Shockley, “Cannonizing” Under Newt Gingrich: The Speaker’s
Consolidation of Power in the House of Representatives, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 170–73 (1998).
79
See id. at 173.
80
See infra Part V.C.
81
Sanregret Shockley, supra note 78, at 173.
82
See Bryan Craig, The 1995–96 Government Shutdown, UVA MILLER CTR.,
https://millercenter.org/1995-96-government-shutdown (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
73
74
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Congress to enact appropriations and end the shutdown.83
The second major shutdown occurred in 2013 (“the 2013
shutdown”).84 This shutdown derived from the election of a Republican
House, who wanted to repeal the Affordable Care Act.85 President Barack
Obama opposed the repeal effort.86 Again, the public overwhelmingly
blamed the House.87 In a rather unpopular move, President Obama
implemented the shutdown by stopping a number of agency functions,
exemplified by shutting down the start of new clinical trials by the
Department of Health and Human Services.88 In the end, the intense public
dislike of the shutdown, and its blame of the House, forced the House to enact
appropriations and end the shutdown.89
After the 2013 shutdown, it might still have been conceivable to look
at shutdowns as though they were rare and sui generis events. It could be
asserted that the 1995 shutdown had been some kind of strange novelty.
Almost two decades passed between the 1995 shutdown and the 2013
shutdown, and so it could have still been imagined that large-scale shutdowns
were infrequent, albeit major, like declared wars or Presidential
impeachments. And, it might have been thought that the lesson of both
shutdowns—namely, that whoever got blamed became the loser—might have
inhibited any players from undertaking another subsequent shutdown.
However, shutdown law received a fresh and powerful boost from the
shutdown in 2019. This was the second shutdown in a decade. Shutdowns
were no longer a novelty. The legal questions became prominent, and it
seemed now quite valid that the law of shutdowns merited study.
D. Mechanics
1. Employee Labels
In the wake of the Civiletti opinions and modern shutdowns, the
following discussion will describe the basic mechanics of a shutdown. During
a shutdown, federal employees fall into three categories. First, a limited

83
See David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default
Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 220 (2015); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative
Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 457,
508–09 (1997).
84
See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Hardball vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally Antidemocratic
Tactics, 119 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 85, 96–97 (2019) (discussing the major government shutdowns in
1995, 2013, and 2019).
85
See id. at 96.
86
See id.
87
See Louk & Gamage, supra note 83, at 223.
88
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-86, THREE DEPARTMENTS REPORTED
VARYING DEGREES OF IMPACTS ON OPERATIONS, GRANTS, AND CONTRACTS 15 (2014),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666526.pdf.
89
See Louk & Gamage, supra note 83, at 223.
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number of employees continued to work and get paid.90 These are employees
whose employment is “authorized by law.”91 As provided in 31 U.S.C. §
1342: “An officer or employee of the United States Government or the
District of Columbia government may not accept voluntary services for either
government or employ personal services exceeding that authorized by law
except for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of
property.”92 That “authorized by law” exception has a limited role. Generally,
it applies to “entitlements,” which are funds like Social Security which
operate without requiring appropriations.93 Agencies, like Social Security,
that send out entitlement checks are authorized by law to perform their
functions.94 While Social Security and similar entitlements are large in scale,
they are a small fraction of all programs, and the vast majority of federal
government employees do not work on such entitlements.95
Next, there are two categories of employees in appropriated (nonentitlement) programs. The first type of employee in this category are the
employees whose work during “emergencies involving the safety of human
life or the protection of property.”96 The classic example, as citied in the
second Civiletti opinion, is the federal firefighter.97 Shutdown parlance labels
such employees as “excepted,” meaning they go to work, but do not get paid
during the shutdown.98
It is noteworthy that precisely since “excepted” employees perform
vital services, and because they do not want to work without pay, they have
some power to force an end to the shutdown. For example, during the very
last days of the 2019 shutdown, a number of air traffic controllers stopped
showing up for work and thus paralyzed air transportation.99 The shutdown
was probably headed for an end, even without their “sick-out,” but they
delivered the coup de grace.100
90

See BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 4–7; OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 2, at 1–2.
BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 5 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 1341).
92
31 U.S.C. § 1342.
93
BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 35.
94
Id.
95
See id. at 3.
96
31 U.S.C. § 1342.
97
Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in
Appropriations, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 306 (1981).
98
See OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 2, at 1, 6.
99
Ellie Kaufman & Rene Marsh, The Government Shutdown Ended After Only 10 Air Traffic
Controllers Stayed Home, CNN (Feb. 6, 2019, 5:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/06/politics/tenair-traffic-controllers-shutdown/index.html; Joseph A. McCartin, How Air Traffic Controllers Helped End
the Shutdown—and Changed History, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2019, 1:21 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/2019/01/26/how-air-traffic-controllers-helped-end-shutdown-changed-history/.
100
Other airplane incidents show the striking effect of shutdowns, during and afterward. Two aviation
disasters in 2018 and 2019 consisted of crashes of Boeing 737 Max planes. Timeline: Boeing 737 Max
Jetliner Crashes and Aftermath, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 14, 2019, 7:52 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/business/ct-biz-viz-boeing-737-max-crash-timeline-04022019-story.html. After the first crash, Boeing
planned on a software fix by January 2019. Natalie Kitroeff et al., Boeing Promised Pilots a 737 Software
Fix Last Year, but They’re Still Waiting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2CkD2gV. The 2019
91
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The second category of employees are those not serving imminent
safety or property protection.101 Most employees fall in this category. They
are “furloughed,” meaning they are sent home, do not work, and are not paid.
102 Furloughed employees traditionally receive retroactive pay at the end of
a shutdown, although technically the threat remains that they do not have a
restitutionary claim to be paid, and hence could be denied retroactive pay.103
Undoubtedly, the combination of no pay, no work, and no restitution claim to
pay, takes a harsh emotional toll on these employees.104
2. Management Structure
Another aspect of the practical mechanics for shutdowns consists of
the management structure erected by the OMB. Some decades back, the
OMB began giving general guidance to executive agencies in terms of how
to plan for shutdowns, as well as guidance for these agencies to use during
shutdowns.105 Eventually, the OMB’s approach to shutdown guidance
became so systematic that it now requires agencies to submit regular updates
of their shutdown plans for the OMB’s review.106
For those analyzing the nitty-gritty classifications of employees at
any and all of the agencies affected by a shutdown, these plans provide
transparency.107 For example, shutdown analyses by the Congressional
Research Service draw heavily on the OMB plans.108 Apart from OMB’s
analytical assistance, the combination of the OMB planning beforehand and
guidance in real time makes it possible to understand how the Trump
shutdown intervened. The press reported that the second crash was “because Boeing’s disagreements with
the Federal Aviation Administration kept delaying the repair—and its discussions with the FAA stopped
altogether during the five-week government shutdown . . . .” Kathryn Krawczyk, How the Government
Shutdown Reportedly Stopped Boeing from Fixing Its 737 MAX Planes, THE WEEK (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://theweek.com/speedreads/828982/how-government-shutdown-reportedly-stopped-boeing-fromfixing-737-max-planes (emphasis added).
101
See U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 2, at 2.
102
See id. at 2–6.
103
BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 14. But see Niv Elis & Juliegrace Brufke, The 7 Republicans Who
Voted Against Back Pay for Furloughed Workers, THE HILL (Jan. 11, 2019, 1:36 PM), https://thehill.
com/homenews/house/424942-the-7-republicans-who-voted-against-back-pay-for-furloughedgovernment-workers.
104
See Lisa E. Baranik et al., What Happens When Employees Are Furloughed? A Resource Loss
Perspective, 46 J. OF CAREER DEV. 381, 389 (2019).
105
See generally OFF. OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 80-14,
SHUTDOWN OF AGENCY OPERATIONS UPON FAILURE BY THE CONGRESS TO ENACT APPROPRIATIONS
(1980), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/furlough-guidance/attachment_a-5.pdf.
106
JARED C. NAGEL & JUSTIN MURRAY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41759, PAST GOVERNMENT
SHUTDOWNS: KEY RESOURCES 7 (2019) (citing an OMB circular that required for plans “to be submitted
to OMB at a minimum every two years starting August 1, 2015”), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41759.pdf.
107
To provide for such transparency, many agencies have made their shutdown contingency plans
available for public review. See Agency Contingency Plans, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/information-for-agencies/agency-contingency-plans/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
108
See JUSTIN MURRAY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43250, CRS RESOURCES ON THE FY2014 FUNDING
GAP, SHUTDOWN, AND STATUS OF APPROPRIATIONS 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43250.pdf
(listing analyses and reports from the Congressional Research Service, many of which source their data
from OMB plans).
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Administration could implement, across the very broad span of agencies, a
new approach to the ADA.
V: THE WRONGFUL EXECUTIVE STANCE OF OPENING AGENCIES
WHEN IT LIKES
A. 2019 Shutdown Background
Part V of this Article focuses on the 2019 shutdown. This time, a
Democratic House faced off with Republican President Trump.109 The
legislative issue was President Trump’s demand for a border wall on a grand
scale, which, according to President Trump, was the way to keep out migrants
Before the shutdown, President Trump took the
from Mexico.110
extraordinary step of expressly announcing he would take the blame for the
shutdown, contrary to the virtually unanimous effort of leaders of the past to
cast the blame on their opponents.111 Not surprisingly, the public largely
blamed President Trump for the 2019 shutdown.112 As in previous major
shutdowns, the attempts of the initially blamed party to get the public to
change its mind about whom to blame came to naught.113
Faced with the public blaming them, the Trump Administration was
left with seeking to reduce the public’s sense of the impact of the shutdown.
It had one advantage: the shutdown was partial in that it only applied to seven
appropriation bills.114 The biggest departments, Health and Human Services
and Defense, had appropriations and, thus, were not affected by the 2019
shutdown, so the public would not be antagonized about them.115
Nevertheless, “about 25 percent of the government [was] without funding,
including the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Justice Department and the

109
Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael Tackett, Trump and Democrats Dig in After Talks to Reopen
Government Go Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/us/politics
/trump-congress-shutdown.html.
110
See id.; Glenn Kessler, President Trump’s Error-Filled Holiday Tweets on the Border Wall, WASH.
POST (Jan 2. 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/02/president-trumpserror-filled-holiday-tweets-border-wall/.
111
Compare Davis & Tackett, supra note 109 (noting that President Trump would “proudly own the
consequences if that mean a shutdown”) with Matea Gold et al., In Shutdown Blame Game, Democrats and
Republicans United: It’s the Other Side’s Fault, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-shutdown-blame-game-democrats-and-republicans-unitedits-the-other-sides-fault/2013/09/30/759b136e-29e6-11e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html
(describing
how, during past shutdowns, politicians usually blamed other people for the shutdown).
112
William Cummings, Americans Blame Shutdown on Trump Over Democrats by Wide Margin, Poll
Finds, USA TODAY (Jan. 13, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics
/onpolitics/2019/01/13/shutdown-abc-washington-post-poll/2564178002/.
113
See Grace Sparks, Who Gets Blamed for a Government Shutdown?, CNN (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:02 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/11/politics/shutdown-blame-polling/index.html.
114
Nicole Ogrysko, Partial Government Shutdown Begins After Congress, White House Fail to Reach
Spending Deal, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 21, 2019, 4:51 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/
government-shutdown/2018/12/agencies-make-last-minute-updates-to-shutdown-contingency-plans/.
115
Id.
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Internal Revenue Service.”116
B. President Trump’s Distorting of the ADA
The issue that this Article is focused on is the nature of the change in
meaning that the 2019 shutdown, and President Trump’s actions during the
shutdown, gave to the ADA. As this Article has explored, the ADA serves as
An occasional, minor
a cornerstone of the Fiscal Constitution.117
misinterpretation of the ADA has limited significance. But what happened in
2019 was an overall major twisting of the ADA away from its text and the
history of its applications. This changed—away from legality—the meaning
espoused for that cornerstone of the Fiscal Constitution.
During the 2019 shutdown, the Trump Administration faced the
elaborate evolution of precedents and plans intended to carry out the ADA’s
intent. As described above, the ADA’s intent had been to close down and
idle—furlough—a large majority of agencies.118 As for keeping open
“essential” agencies, the ADA intended those agencies to be those that the
closure of would create an imminent “emergency,” not just a public
inconvenience.119 This key distinction separates essential and non-essential
federal workers. Certain examples reveal the Trump Administration’s
strategy, and how it deviates from legal precedents. The following discussion
will discuss these examples in detail.
1. The IRS Difference
The OMB had cited “several kinds of ‘economic disruption’” due to
“suspension of Internal Revenue Service . . . income verification used by
financial institutions to help determine credit-worthiness of prospective
borrowers . . . .”120 In other words, during the 2013 shutdown, the OMB had
known that stopping mortgage verifications would produce economic
disruption, but had also known this was not an “emergency” threat to
“safety.”121 Despite this precedent, during the 2019 shutdown, the OMB
116
Ayesha Rascoe, Attempts to Make Shutdown ‘Painless’ May Stretch Limits of Federal Law, NPR
(Jan. 18, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/18/685829213/attempts-to-make-shutdownpainless-may-stretch-limits-of-federal-law.
117
See generally supra Parts I–IV.
118
See supra Part IV.D.
119
Government Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations, 1995 O.L.C. LEXIS 57, at *5,
21 (Aug. 16, 1995).
120
Id. at 30 (quoting OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, IMPACTS AND COSTS
OF THE OCTOBER 2013 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2 (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/impacts-and-costs-of-october-2013-federal-government-shutdownreport.pdf).
121
See id.; 31 U.S.C. § 1342; Lisa Rein & Jeff Stein, ‘Could You Make These Guys Essential?’:
Mortgage Industry Gets Shutdown Relief After Appeal to Senior Treasury Officials, WASH. POST (Jan. 11,
2019, 5:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/could-you-make-these-guys-essentialmortgage-industry-gets-shutdown-relief-after-appeal-to-senior-treasury-officials/2019/01/11/9071e9d8152c-11e9-90a8-136fa44b80ba_story.html.
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directed the IRS to bring the mortgage verifiers in to work, as covered by the
ADA exception for emergencies.122 The press reported that “[t]he Trump
administration . . . direct[ed] federal employees . . . [to] provide documents
for mortgage processing . . . .”123
Likewise, the OMB cited that, due to the 2013 shutdown, “[a]lmost
$4 billion in tax refunds were delayed.”124 But traditionally, the IRS does not
bring back the IRS employees who handle refunds.125 Therefore, it cannot
be said that the government needs to make prompt refunds in order to keep
functioning. So, although the OMB of course knew that delay of refunds
burdened taxpayers, it also knew that tax refunds were not an “emergency”
threat to “safety.”126
Further, the Taxpayer Advocacy Service headlined a memo section
which stated: “The IRS Chief Counsel Interpretation of the ADA in 2013
Recognized Only Risks to Public Health and Protection of Government
Property,” and this interpretation “did not apply to a taxpayer’s need for a
refund . . . .”127 It is noteworthy here that the existing application of the ADA
did not come from to some loose cannon down in the depths of the IRS. It
came from the Chief Counsel of the IRS, who surely knew and followed the
precedents in making such a tough call.
However, during the 2019 shutdown, the press reported that “[t]he
IRS . . . call[ed] 46,000 furloughed employees back to work without pay to
help process tax refunds for tax filing season . . . .”128 Apparently the OMB
and the IRS rationalized that since taxpayers had an entitlement to tax refunds,
this fit the model of Social Security employees working on distributing Social
Security payments.129 Due to President Trump’s large tax cuts for certain
people or businesses, it is highly likely that, at the start of 2019, Trump
supporters were among the earliest to file tax return, so keeping the IRS
functioning during the shutdown served to benefit the President’s

122

Rein & Stein, supra note 121.
Damian Paletta, To Keep a Shut Down Government Running, White House Ventures into Uncharted
Territory, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2019, 7:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/tokeep-a-shut-down-government-running-white-house-ventures-into-uncharted-territory/2019/01/10/ff1d5
ed4-14e7-11e9-90a8-136fa44b80ba_story.html.
124
Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Impacts and Costs of the Government Shutdown, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 7,
2013, 3:38 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/11/07/impacts-and-costs-governmentshutdown.
125
See id.
126
See 31 U.S.C. § 1342.
127
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 OBJECTIVES, REPORT TO CONGRESS 81 (2014),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Themes/TAS.theme2/Content/Documents/FY15-Full-Report/Volume1.pdf.
128
Rascoe, supra note 116.
129
CF. BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 35–36 (explaining that the Social Security Agency continued
to employee workers during the shutdown to process entitlements like social security benefits).
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supporters.130
Unmistakably, the OMB made a complete 180-degree turn on this
issue. As explained by one reporter:
One aspect that’s in dispute is . . . that the IRS can issue tax
refunds during the shutdown. In 2011, OMB directed the IRS
not to issue refunds in the event of a funding lapse. This
month the IRS cited a permanent appropriation when saying
it has long been of the belief that it can distribute refunds, and
that OMB has reviewed the law and determined that the
agency can pay refunds during the shutdown.131
President Trump made a trillion-dollar tax cut a signal feature of his
first two years in office.132 These early refund-seekers were likely the prime
beneficiaries of President Trump’s tax cut. The Trump Administration would
not let the ADA frustrate his constituency. This was met with serious
criticism.133
2. The Interior Department Difference
Similarly, during the 2013 shutdown, the OMB ordered cessation of
“several kinds of permitting, reviews, and licensing (e.g., 200 applications for
a permit to drill for energy resources) . . . .”134 It knew that this would be a
problem for drilling companies, and if one strained the point one could say
the government was losing a property interest: namely, putting off in time the
stream of royalties from drilling. The scale of this might be many tens of
millions of dollars per month.135 But the OMB had also known that these
types of operations were not an “emergency” threat to “property.”136
However, during the 2019 shutdown, the press reported that “the
Interior Department [was] bringing back furloughed workers to help with
planning for an offshore lease sale for oil and gas development in the Gulf of
Mexico. The department says it will use leftover funds to support this
130
See John Wagner, Trump Touts Benefits of Tax Cuts for ‘the People that Like Me Best’ WASH. POST
(Nov. 29, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/11/29/trumptouts-benefits-of-tax-cuts-for-the-people-that-like-me-best/.
131
Naomi Jagoda, Dems Lash Out at Trump for Recalling Furloughed Workers, THE HILL (Jan. 19,
2019, 11:01 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/426123-dems-lash-out-at-trump-for-recallingfurloughed-workers.
132
Scott Horsley, After 2 Years, Trump Tax Cuts Have Failed to Deliver on GOP’s Promises, NPR
(Dec. 20, 2019, 11:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/20/789540931/2-years-later-trump-tax-cutshave-failed-to-deliver-on-gops-promises; Andy Uhler, Where Did the $1.5 Trillion in Trump Tax Cuts
Go?, MARKETPLACE (May 2, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/05/29/where-did-trump-tax-cutsgo/.
133
Rascoe, supra note 116.
134
BRASS ET AL., supra note 10, at 30.
135
See Alex Park et al., Triumph of the Drill: How Big Oil Clings to Billions in Government Giveaways,
MOTHER JONES (April 14, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/oil-subsidies-renewableenergy-tax-breaks/.
136
See 31 U.S.C § 1342.
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action.”137 This was met with legal criticism.138
Here again, the OMB and the Interior Department applied shutdown
law favorably toward President Trump’s corporate constituency. The Trump
Administration had taken numerous actions to support the oil industry in
general and to support its drilling on public lands in particular.139 While this
step went out of line with shutdown precedents, it stayed in line with
Administration support for the industry.140
3. The National Parks Difference
During the 1995 shutdown, the Clinton Administration famously
closed the national parks.141 The Clinton Administration had to know that
park visitors paid fees, but could not imagine that the ADA would allow for
park employees to remain on the job, like those processing entitlements like
Social Security.142 To the Clinton Administration, park fees could not
constitute the functional equivalent to appropriations in terms of funding
“authorized by law.”143 In contrast, in 2019, “[t]he Trump administration
[directed] federal employees . . . [to] open up national parks.”144 This was
met with serious criticism.145
C. The Backlash
Some reports summed up the 2019 shutdown and the actions taken
by the OMB and Trump Administration, arriving at conclusions consistent
with this Article. For example, as described by one news article: “[t]he rapid
and in many cases unprecedented scope of OMB’s directives has prompted
criticism from Democrats and some Republicans that the White House is
137

Rascoe, supra note 116.
See generally Sara Divett, Is Drilling “Essential”?: Oil and Gas Leasing and Permitting in the
2019 Shutdown, GEO. LAW: GEO. ENV’T L. REV. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
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bending the rules to contain political fallout.”146
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely this will just constitute a one-time
deviation from the well-established view of the ADA, particularly in any
instance in which the President, rather than Congress, takes the blame. This
is a one-way shift. Future Presidents will not make the blame they shoulder
any heavier now that the Trump Administration has pioneered a way to
lighten the problem. Rather, they will take what OMB did this time as “the
new normal.” They will take the ADA cornerstone as having shifted its
ground. For them, it no longer backs up the Appropriations Clause and makes
those responsible for appropriations lapses pay a heavy price in public
opprobrium. The ADA has been twisted so that anything unpopular during a
shutdown can get wished away as a changeable inconvenience.
VI: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Part VI of the Article looks at proposed solutions. Congress has
considered a complete solution—an automatic continuing resolution.147 This
type of resolution would provide funds during any lapse between one
appropriation and the next.148 The principal variations consist of how to
figure the rate of payment.149 It could be frozen at the last appropriated rate
or at some percentage of the last appropriated rate.150 But then, the agency
would have no way to adapt to new problems or initiatives.
However, an automatic continuing resolution has never had much
acceptance and will never overcome congressional antipathy to the
importance of its appropriation process. The appropriators do not want to
forfeit their role. One or both chambers might accept stalemate in
appropriation bills too readily, knowing that the automatic continuing
resolution waited as a fallback. This would undermine the acceptance of the
necessity for the appropriators to work something out.
One measure that would not have helped in 2019 but did in 2013. In
2019, the lapse in appropriations did not include the defense appropriation, so
the partial shutdown did not include the Defense Department.151 However in
2013, the lapse included defense.152 Although the armed forces surely were
“essential,” that would only have meant they would stay on duty, not that they
146
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would get payment.153 Congress enacted a measure somewhat like an
automatic continuing resolution, called the “Pay Our Military Act.”154 It
provided automatic funding from October 1, 2013, and terminated with a
regular enactment on October 17, 2013.155 Similar continuity could be
provided in future shutdowns.
Other measures could ameliorate the sharpest immediate pain of the
shutdown, namely, bettering the condition of the unpaid federal employees
who are helpless pawns. They eventually get the denied pay after the
shutdown ends. But they suffer from not getting the pay in real time,
especially if their pay rate has not let them build up savings, and especially as
the shutdown goes past their first pay period and then their second. They
should, at least, have a federal guarantee letting them borrow against their
withheld pay.
It might be argued that without the federal employees suffering,
Congress and the President might not have enough pressure forcing them to
enact appropriations and end the shutdown, as evidenced by the press
coverage of public employee struggle during the 2019 shutdown.156
However, most Senators and Congressmen do not have a large percentage of
public employees in their constituency, and that is not where the main force
comes from to drive the passage of appropriations. The driving force to end
a shutdown comes from the overall chaos from federal programs either shut
down or slowed down. So, easing federal employee suffering during a
shutdown is not likely to change the driving force to end shutdowns.
A separate problem concerns the approach the OMB took in 2019, to
the Fiscal Constitution, which included keeping many programs going that
were just popular and not in any real sense “essential.” The OMB’s approach
shifted the ADA away from the role it has played since the Civiletti opinions
four decades before—of stopping all programs except essential ones (or,
programs like entitlements). Conceivably, at the next shutdown, the President
will return to properly following the ADA. Alternatively, Congress could add
language to the ADA expressly stating the limits on the Executive Branch.
VII: CONCLUSION
This Article takes the thinking about shutdowns well beyond the level
of seeing it as a rarity or political posturing. The fight is over legal principles
of the Fiscal Constitution apply across the board to the entire federal
153
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government. From the 2019 shutdown, it is clear that whichever Branch, most
likely the Executive, takes the “blame,” it seeks to mitigate the shutdown by
seeking to classify a large fraction of agencies as “essential.” It is too much
to expect a cure for shutdowns. This struggle in the separation of powers will
continue.
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